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Recent Abort Flight Test Events 
•  Pad Abort 1 flight test occurred on 6 May 2010 from White Sands 
Missile Range in New Mexico 
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  Orion’s	  Launch	  Abort	  System	  (LAS)	  
provides	  an	  emergency	  escape	  system	  for	  
the	  crew	  
  Abort	  Flight	  Test	  Objectives:	  
  Provide	  adequate	  testing	  to	  
demonstrate	  proper	  performance	  and	  
function	  of	  the	  LAS	  throughout	  the	  
required	  ﬂight	  envelope	  	  
  Validate	  key	  abort	  models	  
  LAS	  performance	  and	  functionality	  
  Parachute	  system	  performance	  and	  
functionality	  
  Separation	  aerodynamics	  
  Separation	  mechanism	  performance	  
  Pathﬁnder	  for	  Orion	  system	  integration	  
and	  ground	  operations	  procedures	  
Abort Flight Test 
3 
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Launch Abort System 
•  Safely removes the crew from 
launch vehicle in an emergency  
•  Protects crew module from 
atmospheric loads and heating  
•  Jettisons after successful pad 
operations and first stage flight 
Service Module 
•  Supports crew module from 
launch through separation  
•  Accommodates unpressurized 
cargo or mission science 
equipment 
Crew Module 
•  Provides safe habitat for crew 
•  Allows reentry and landing as 
a stand alone module 
•  ISS “lifeboat” capability 
Spacecraft Adapter 
•  Provides connection to 
launch vehicle  
•  Protects Service Module 
components 
Orion Spacecraft Overview 
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Ares V - 
Heavy 
Lift 
Launch  
Vehicle 
Ares I - 
Crew 
Launch  
Vehicle 
Earth 
Departure 
Stage 
Orion - 
Crew  
Exploration 
Vehicle 
Lunar 
Lander 
Components of Program Constellation 
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Launch Abort System (LAS) and 
Crew Module (CM) 
Nose Cone 
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Abort Motor Test Firing 
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Jettison Motor Firing 
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ORION 
LAUNCH ABORT 
SYSTEM 
JETTISON MOTOR :;; DEMONS~RAWO~
.. .. - ... ; ... .'q1 I111'~ ) 
f~~V: it tO~8 . . 
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Attitude Control Motor Firing 
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Pad Abort 1 (PA-1)Trajectory Cartoon 
 Event 
1.  AM/ACM ignition 
2.  AM burnout 
3.  Begin re-orientation 
4.  End re-orientation 
5.  LAS Jettison 
6.  FBC jettison 
7.  Drogue mortar fire 
8.  Pilot mortar fire 
9.  LAS touchdown 
10.  Reach 33 ft/sec descent rate 
11.  CM touchdown 
PA-1 test at White Sands was designed to fly a due North trajectory, 
At KSC, the pad abort trajectory ‘dog-legs’ towards the ocean 11 
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Launch Abort Vehicle (LAV) Controller Info 
•  For PA-1, LAV controller was developed by Orbital-Dulles 
–  PID controller, had heritage from Pegasus 
–  On-board gain scheduling based on mass properties changes 
–  Roll-yaw coupling (p-beta) which used a yaw command to dampen roll rates 
–  Timer-based guidance 
•  0-2 seconds; open-loop pitch-over to get downrange; commanded pitch & 
yaw 
•  2-10 seconds; downrange guidance; commanded alpha & beta 
•  10-21 seconds; reorientation guidance; commanded alpha & beta 
•  All commands turned into attitude rate commands in FSW before they were 
passed to the ACM controller 
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Mobile Operations Facility (MOF) Overview 
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Chute Installation 
DFI Installation 
Acoustic Blanket Installation 
Chute Installation 
Chutes  Acoustic Blankets Intercom panels (18) 
Telemetry, video, timing 
distribution, and 
processing equipment 
racks (7) 
LM Command, Control, 
and Monitoring System 
racks - not shown (3.5) 
Workstation displays (21) 
Video Monitors (4) 
P
ro
je
ct
 O
rio
n:
 F
lig
ht
 T
es
t O
ffi
ce
 
WSMR Tracking Optics 
CM	  
LAS	  
FBC	  
Bill Site has wide 
FOV camera and 2 
mounts total 
Dee Site has wide 
FOV camera 
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Footage from various video sites 
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•  PA-1 Compilation video 
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Personal Experiences / Lessons Learned 
•  Launch Fever, noun: An unwillingness to miss an important deadline 
despite known problems. 
–  High speed film camera in crew module 
–  SIGI-2 issues 
–  ACM controller issues 
–  Coyote 
•  Managing emotions associated with the launch 
–  Went through various failure scenarios 
•  Tip-over risk 
•  High vibration associated with the initial pull-away 
•  Risk of loss of controller authority with jet interaction 
•  Risk of parachute failure 
–  Stress near T-0 
•  Coping techniques 
•  Estimating probability of mission success 
–  81 unique PA-1 related risks 
16 
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Lessons Learned (continued) 
•  Project pace & travel (4 years) 
•  Number of different organizations involved – always complicated 
–  Flight Test Office was the responsible flight test organization 
–  On some level, you needed to be Al Haig-like 
•  Lessons Learned take awhile to process, then recognize & identify 
–  Project collected Lessons Learned just after launch 
–  Lessons Learned in wind placard story 
17 
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Lessons Learned – wind placards story 
•  Surprised at how ‘basic’ things became issues that grew quickly out 
of control (the ‘how-did-we-get-here?’ phenomenon)* 
–  Wind placards were an example of this 
•  Early on, LM Mission Analysis group identified an issue with the 
winds modeling in GRAM-99 with the WSMR RRA (wasn’t 
consistent with weather balloon data, RRA data from the 1980’s) 
•  FTO agreed to go with the WSMR RRA from GRAM-2007 put into 
GRAM-99, our concern was that the weather balloon data hadn’t 
been blessed by the Air Force organization (AFCCC) that certifies 
RRAs 
•  Using this RRA caused the LM Mission Analysis group to develop 
placards that were very restrictive, and it became a lot of work to get 
these placards expanded to reasonable operational levels 
•  Control room operations were down to a minimal staff (due to MOF 
size), support personnel were available, but communication was 
sometimes spotty 
18 * Still working to define all the lessons learned here 
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Lessons Learned (continued) 
Proposed wind placard table, not the actual table used for launch 19 
Altitude Above WGS-84 Reference Ellipsoid (tt) 
4000 4500 5000 5500 6000 6500 7000 7500 8000 8500 9000 9500 10000 10500 11000 
1· 10 10.0 10.7 13.0 13.4 15.0 16.7 17.3 17.5 19.8 21.2 22.6 23 .4 23 .0 23 .0 23.0 
11-20 10.1 11.0 12.8 13.9 15.2 15.8 16.8 19.0 20.5 22.1 24.4 24.9 25.5 25.5 25.5 
21-30 10.7 11.7 13.6 13.7 14.4 15.5 16.7 17.3 19.1 20.4 21.1 22.0 22.7 22.7 22.7 
31-40 10.3 12.5 13.9 14.5 15.1 15.7 17.1 17.6 19.0 18.5 18.5 19.7 17.6 17.6 17.6 
41-50 11.4 12.4 13.5 13.9 15.' 16.8 16.6 17.8 17.4 17.0 17.6 18.6 18.4 18.4 18.4 
51-60 11.1 13.0 13.3 14.3 14.6 16.2 16.4 15.' 16.1 16.6 17.1 17.2 17.2 17.2 17.2 Iii 61-70 11.7 12.1 12.8 13.2 14.5 15.1 15.2 14.9 15.3 14.7 14.5 15.3 16.4 16.4 16.4 QI 
.. 71-80 11.4 11.7 12.8 12.9 12.8 14.6 14.8 14.0 14.2 14.7 15.7 15.7 17.0 17.0 17.0 QI 
"-
C j 81-90 10.7 11.3 12.5 12.4 13.0 13.6 14.2 13.6 13.6 14.8 16.5 17.0 17.9 17.9 17.9 QO QI 91-100 10.1 11.9 11.3 11.2 12.3 13.0 12.6 13.0 13.9 14.4 13.9 14.8 15.7 15.7 15.7 "'C 101-110 11.0 10.4 11.9 12.0 13.3 12.7 13.1 13.5 14.4 12.6 14.8 12.9 12.8 12.8 12.8 
- ,2 aI 
.s::. 111-120 8.8 10.2 10.2 11.0 11.5 12.1 13.3 12.0 11.1 12.1 11.4 11.5 12.2 12.2 12.2 
t:: .... III 121-130 8.' 9.8 10.7 9.6 9.8 10.3 10.0 13.0 11.9 10.4 11.0 14.1 11.8 11.8 11.8 C ,_ 
0 CLI 
"'C 131-140 8.3 8.3 8.' 9.6 10.3 12.6 8.9 9.5 10.2 9.9 13.0 10.3 9.1 9.1 9.1 Z > C C 141-150 7.3 8.7 8.5 8.9 9.9 12.1 11.6 11.5 12.4 12.6 12.2 10.5 9.3 9.3 9.3 b 0 ~ 151-160 8.2 9.6 11.0 10.9 11.0 11.2 U .2 11.7 12.5 12.4 13.3 13.6 12.2 12.2 12.2 E U 161-170 8.7 10.5 10.9 12.4 12.0 12.4 U .6 12.7 13.4 12.8 13.5 13.9 14.3 14.3 14.3 
- C 0 ra 
,2 171-180 9.' 11.0 12.4 12.7 13.0 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.6 14.6 15.1 15.9 16.0 16.0 16.0 
"-
U 181-190 10.4 11.7 13.8 14.2 15.2 15.6 15.' 15.1 16.4 16.2 16.6 17.1 16.6 16.6 16.6 
-
'9j 1:) 
QI 191-200 11.8 13.7 15.8 15.3 15.7 18.6 18.3 17.6 18.8 18.2 18.7 19.8 18.5 18.5 18.5 
i 
0 QI 
'0 "- 201-210 12.6 14.8 15.8 16.9 17.8 19.2 19.3 20.4 20.8 22.4 21.8 23 .2 23 .7 23 .7 23.7 
"- 0 211-220 13.8 15.9 17.5 18.1 19.2 21.2 21.9 22.9 24.1 25.0 25.1 26.0 25.9 25 .9 25.9 0 III 221-230 14.4 16.4 18.8 20.5 21.3 24.3 25.0 25.8 27.7 29.3 30.7 33 .2 33.4 33 .4 33.4 U CLI QI 0 .... 231-240 15.' 17.6 20.1 21.2 23 .1 25.3 26.4 28.7 29.6 31.5 33.4 35.9 36.1 36.1 36.1 
U CLI C ~ 
-
241-250 15.8 19.5 20.9 23 .1 24.8 26.9 27.8 29.0 31.3 32.9 34.' 37.2 38.4 38.4 38.4 
.s::. QI 251-260 16.3 18.3 21.3 22.5 24.4 26.3 27.5 30.1 32.2 34.7 36.1 37.9 39.5 39 .5 39.5 
.... 0 261-270 14.4 16.0 19.7 19.8 21.5 24.2 26.3 26.6 30.0 31.4 33.0 35.9 37.5 37.5 37.5 
:l ~ E 271-280 12.1 14.2 15.6 19.0 20.7 21.9 23.9 24.7 26.3 29.4 31.8 32.1 34.6 34.6 34.6 .... 
~ :l 
281-290 10.7 12.5 14.1 15.6 17.5 19.9 20.9 22.0 23.5 27.4 27.8 29.8 32.4 32.4 32.4 
E 291-300 9.3 10.9 11.8 13.6 15.' 17.3 18.2 20.4 22.' 23.1 23.4 24.6 26.2 26.2 26.2 
~ 301-310 9.7 10.0 11.8 14.6 14.0 15.6 17.2 19.0 20.2 21.4 22.8 23 .0 26.2 26.2 26.2 311-320 9.7 9.2 11.8 12.4 14.2 16.2 17.4 17.4 19.1 20.1 22.2 24.3 25 .5 25.5 25.5 
- 321-330 8.9 10.7 10.7 11.7 14.3 15.2 16.6 19.1 19.3 20.9 21.5 24.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 
331-340 8.' 9.6 11.1 13.2 13.8 15.6 17.5 17.2 19.6 22.1 24.0 24.2 27.5 27.5 27.5 
341-350 8.7 10.5 12.0 12.6 14.2 15.2 16.3 19.3 19.5 21.3 23.6 23.0 25.9 25 .9 25.9 
351-360 8.5 9.6 11.7 14.0 14.8 16.1 16.4 17.4 19.8 20.4 22.0 24.7 26.6 26.6 26.6 
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Weather go/no-go call plan progression 
•  Plan A:  GNC & Dryden meteorologist would make the call 
•  Plan B:  at their request, involved LM Mission Analysis personnel in 
weather center; GNC & Dryden MET still make the call 
•  Plan C:  Senior Ops helps GNC in control room when complex 
placards are developed; GNC, Dryden MET, Sr. Ops, FTA lead 
make the call once we see data from weather center 
•  Plan D:  As placard issue becomes more complex & controversial, 
the decision gets pushed up to the Mission Management Team 
(MMT is Orion PM & his support staff) 
–  Used 5 weather balloons on day of launch 
–  Had 924 MHz profiler next to launch site 
–  Flying in the windiest part of the year for White Sands (March - May) 
–  4 day launch window (Thursday – Sunday); can’t go the following week 
due to another higher priority program’s launch  
–  Day before the launch, briefing MMT on weather-101 
20 
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Lessons Learned (continued) 
•    After all that, balloon data showed that we were go for flight, but from the  
Ops recovery team and then from flight data, we learned  
that we were flying in 3-sigma GRAM winds that day 
21 
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Lessons Learned (continued)   
•  Wind Placards 
–  Don’t involve people in the process who don’t have decision making 
authority; or if you do involve them, make sure they have associated 
with them a decision maker who has authority 
–  During flight operations, a data or analysis briefing needs to come with a 
recommendation (ties back to authority) 
•  At earlier stages of the project, analysts tend to show you all the 
data, so decisions can be collectively made by the team – this isn’t 
useful or productive during operations 
–  Additional LLs in work 
22 
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Altitude Time History from flight 
Apogee was 10,386.0 feet (geodetic) 
CM downrange was 6907.5 feet (SIGI measured) 
Total flight time was 134.4 seconds 
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PA-1 Flight Test Ground Track 
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32.425 .... .. .. . . . . ........... .. . . . . . ........... .. . . . . . . .......... . . . . . . . . ........... .. . . . . . ............. . . .. . . .... . 
32.42 .... . .................... . ......... .. :-----""""'--_ .... - .............. . . .............. . .... . 
Ci ! 32.415 ...... ... . , ....... ,., ...... . . , ...... ... .. ...... . : ......... ... ....... : ... .... ..... ..... . 
.. 
"C 
-
-11 
-' 
z 
32.41 ..... ...... .... : ............. ..... . : .. .... ... ....... . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
· . 
: : 
· . 32.405 .......... . ............ . ...... . .... . . . ....... . .......... . .. . ....... . ... . 
- SIGIl Day of Flight 
--SIGI2 Day of Flight 
• eM Lawu:h Stool 
• eM Landing Location 
A FEe Landing Location 
V 
o 
LAS Landing Location 
Reorientation 
o LAS Jettison 
o FEe Jettison 
o Drogue Deploy 
o Main Deploy 
-106.405 -106.4 -106 .395 -106.39 -106.385 -106.38 -106.375 
E Longitude (deg) 
P
ro
je
ct
 O
rio
n:
 F
lig
ht
 T
es
t O
ffi
ce
 
Post-flight data comparisons to simulation 
•  ANTARES simulation runs done using post-flight updated simulation 
models for 
–  Abort Motor thrust profile from flight 
–  Attitude Control Motor thrust profile from flight 
–  Meterology day-of-flight atmospheric model 
–  Mass Properties 
–  Parachutes (higher fidelity models incorporated) 
•  Still waiting for day-of-flight aerodynamic models to come in 
–  Possible that drag is not as high as pre-flight aero models predict? 
25 
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Flight Data compared to dispersed simulation runs 
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Ground Track 
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• 
32.44 
32.435 
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Winds blowing from West to the East 
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6 May 2010 – 6:09am local time 
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What is next for Orion & Abort Flight Test 
•  Orion program management has decided to pursue OFT-1 as the 
next flight test 
–  Test is mainly an entry test, with only a nominal LAS jettison 
–  OFT-1 is a un-crewed orbital test (no docking with space station) 
–  FT-2 (Orion-2) is the first crewed flight test on the manifest 
•  AA-2 is currently being considered as a follow on test in between 
OFT-1 and FT-2 (Orion-1 & Orion-2) 
–  AA-2 is a transonic abort (LAS abort occurs as vehicle passes through 
Mach 1, about 40 seconds into the ascent) 
–  Would test the production LAV controller 
–  Would be performed with an abort test booster (ATB) 
•  Currently SR 118 Peacekeeper motor 
–  Currently performing a trade study on the AA-2 launch site location 
•  Production launch vehicle determination expected by Oct 31 
30 
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Wrap-Up 
•  Ops candid commentary during flight 
–  Includes helicopter chase video 
•  Questions/Comments? 
31 
